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Abstract 
In this study we offer a socio-pragmatic examination of instances of what is generally
known in  social  psychology  as  “bystander  intervention,”  i.e.  the  social  action  by
which  a  bystander  steps  in  and attempts  to  prevent  a  wrongdoer  from abusing  a
victim.  We  explore  the  relationship  between  (im)politeness  and  participants’
perceptions  and  understandings  of  moral  principles  as  evidenced  by  their
metacommunicative  voicing.  Our  analysis  concentrates  on  cases  of  bystander
intervention  in  the  US  by  analysing  data  drawn  from  a  reality  show.  Bystander
intervention is a noteworthy phenomenon to examine for, at least, two reasons. First,
it is a type of aggressive social action as it poses an uninvited and open challenge to
the  wrongdoer  in  public.  Second,  bystander  intervention  challenges  conventional
behavioural  norms.  It  aims  to  reinstate  what  the  intervener  regards  as  morally
appropriate  behaviour.  This  study  aims  to  contribute  to  current  research  on
(im)politeness by offering a yet unexplored dimension: that of the interface between
metapragmatics,  (im)politeness  and  (im)morality  in  the  interactional  arena  of
bystander intervention. 
1. Introduction
In this study we offer a socio-pragmatic examination of instances of what is generally
known in social psychology as bystander intervention (e.g. Darley and Latané 1968)
where  we  explore  the  relationship  between  (im)politeness  and  participants’
perceptions  and  understandings2 of  moral  principles  as  evidenced  by  their
metacommunicative voicing. In so doing, we address a key knowledge gap in the field
of (im)politeness research.
Our analysis  concentrates  on cases  of  bystander  intervention in  the US by
analysing data drawn from a reality show (see Section 1.2). Bystander intervention
comes into existence as a bystander (or a group) decides to interrupt an on-going act
of injustice performed in a public domain – in the present case, a scene of verbal
abuse, in order to protect the victim, by giving voice to what the intervener regards as
the opinion of the public, and potentially recruiting others. The “line” (Goffman 1967)
the intervener takes in this social situation is indicative of her or his point of view, and
as we argue in this paper, what he or she regards as immoral. In those cases, when
other bystanders are recruited and their actions “align” (Goffman 1974: 496) with that
of  the  intervener,  the  intervention  itself  as  well  as  the  intervener’s  public  face
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(Bargiela-Chiappini 2003) is endorsed.3 On the other hand, misaligned actions from
recruited bystanders run the risk of putting the intervener “out of face” (Goffman
1955).
Bystander  intervention  is  a  ritual  action.  Rituals  represent  performances,
which (re)enact the normative beliefs or values of a relational network or a broader
social group such as singing a national anthem or retelling a joke (Kádár 2013). In the
context of bystander intervention, “the ritual of outspokenness refers to the expected
dramatic action of stepping up against the committer – or group of committers – of a
seemingly immoral action” (Kádár and de La Cruz, in press). If one takes an analyst
view on participation in acts of intervention via outspokenness, it can be argued that
through  outspokenness  an  unratified  “bystander”  or  a  group  of  bystanders  are
transformed into ratified “side-participant(s).” Note that we adopt these concepts of
“unratified bystander”  and “ratified  side-participants” by following the framework
presented  in  Kádár  and  Haugh  (2013:  89),  which  present  participant  statuses
differently  from  Goffman  (1967).  Due  to  its  expected  nature,  outspokenness
reinforces the situated moral  expectations (Boltanski and Thévenot 2000) of other
bystanders (and prospective lay observers of the event as far as it is recorded) in as
much as it represents a symbolically reparative performance of socially unacceptable
behaviour.  Experimental  studies  in  social  psychology  have  demonstrated  that
bystanders and observers of abuse often hope that there will be someone courageous
enough to take  action  and feel  shame if  they  fail  to  intervene  (see,  for  example,
Darley and Latané 1968; Fischer et al. 2006). This, we argue, is because the majority
perceives the wrongdoer’s action as morally  inadmissible.  The examination of the
ritual  of  outspokenness,  therefore,  helps  us  to  explore  the  relationship  between
(im)morality, (im)politeness and metapragmatics.
Bystander  intervention  is  a  reactive  form  of  action,  which  has  a  clear
relationship  with  morality  as  it  comes  into  existence  through  what  social
psychologists describe as “moral judgement” (see, for example, Colby 1987; Haidt
and  Baron  1996;  Piaget  1997,  Feinberg  and  Willer  2012).  Essentially,  moral
judgement refers to the moral evaluation of an on-going act. In this sense, bystander
intervention is not an objective evaluative process. It emerges from the intervener’s
initial reaction and intuitive emotion that something is “right” or “wrong” based on
her or his culture, personal background and psyche, and its subsequent reappraisal,
that  is,  the  process  by  which  the  initial  emotion  is  framed  as  evidenced  in  the
interpretation of the event i.e. the voicing of moral concern, which in the case of the
examples presented here is metacommunicatively articulated.
A moral judgement may be followed by an action; such actions are morally
loaded not only because they are preceded by a moral judgement, but also because
others  tend  to  perceive  them  (by  morally  judging  the  social  action  of  moral
judgement) through moral lenses (Bauman 1991). It is important to draw a distinction
between a  broader  set  of  morally  loaded actions  (e.g.  telling  one’s  child  dos  and
don’ts) and bystander intervention, as the latter takes place in a) the public domain
and b) from an unratified position in as much as the wrongdoer and the victim display
conventional forms of relatedness (e.g. Duck 1994, 1996; Kaplan 2005; Knobloch and
Solomon  2003)  and  the  intervener  is  not  part  of  that  relationship.  Bystander
intervention is different from the broader semantic category of “intervention” as the
latter  involves  a  wide  variety  of  interpersonal  scenes,  with  different  power
relationships, moral judgements, and so on. 
Bystander  intervention  is  a  noteworthy  phenomenon  to  study  for  the
(im)politeness  researcher.  This  is  because  it  is  a  type  of  aggressive  social  action
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which, on the one hand, challenges the conventional norm of being non-conflictive
with others, and on the other hand, aims to reinstate what the intervener regards as
morally appropriate behaviour. In other words, in bystander intervention, conventional
norms  which  are  regarded  as  “social  oughts”  (Culpeper  2011)  are  challenged  by
“moral oughts” as the intervener butts into an interaction between people who are
unrelated to her or him, but related to each other. Although bystander interventions
may  take  place  between  two  strangers  fighting  with  each  other,  the  examples
addressed in this article comprise instances of a bystander’s intervention in someone
else’s (presumably) intimate relationship (i.e. friends, boyfriend and girlfriend, family
unit) as conventionally understood in the culture where the data come from.
The seeming immorality of the wrongdoer’s action runs contrary to normative
behavioural expectations in the public domain,4 thus leading the intervener to interfere
in someone else’s private domain (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987: 73). The wrongdoer
appears  to  be  intimately  related  to  the  victim while  the  intervener  is  a  complete
stranger. Notwithstanding this, the wrongdoer, the victim and the intervener – as well
as other bystanders – share for a fleeting moment the same space. In this sense, the
intervener  could,  in  theory,  justify  the  bystander  intervention  by  appealing  to  an
infringement of her or his personal space in a public domain.5 This is because the
intervener has the right to move freely in public spaces –such as the ones where our
data come from –without having to witness acts which run contrary to the customary
rules that govern behaviour in groups and societies (see, for example, Bicchieri 2006).
The intervener, however, legitimises her or his action by invoking the morality
principle  (i.e.  “moral  oughts”)  while  the  wrongdoer  delegitimises  the  intervener’s
action by invoking notions of politeness (i.e.  “social  oughts”).6 The articulation of
these  principles  within  the  “ritual  of  outspokenness” (Kádár  2013;  see Section 2)
provides  us  with  a  lens  from  which  to  explore  the  intersectionality  between
(im)politeness, morality and metapragmatics. The notion of “(im)politeness” used in
this  article  draws  on  Culpeper’s  (2011)  concept  of  “moral  oughts”  –  and  the
metapragmatic  voicing  of  these  oughts,  in  particular  the  assumed  right  of  being
undisturbed in one’s private space. Following Kádár and Haugh (2013), in those cases
where, we contrast the (im)polite metapragmatic appeals of the wrongdoer and the
(im)moral  appeals  of  the  intervening  bystander,  we  argue  that  politeness  is  not
necessarily at play. This is because these types of events would inherently disqualify
its actors from their entitlement to be treated politely. Such a view would reflect the
understanding of many bystanders (and possibly that of the analyst, too) but not that
of the wrongdoer, as illustrated by his or her metaappeals to politeness. Thus, in line
with  Kádár and Haugh (2013),  we contend  that  any framework of  (im)politeness
should  bring  together  various  understandings  of  politeness,  hence  making  it
unnecessary to solely look into the evaluations made by wrongdoers. As we maintain
in Section 6, this analytic perspective reveals an important aspect of politeness norms,
namely that references to (im)politeness can operate as an interactional resource for a
wrongdoer in certain interpersonal settings. 
In sum, our study aims to contribute to current research on (im)politeness by
offering a yet unexplored dimension: that of the interface between metapragmatics
(Lucy  2004),  (im)politeness  and  (im)morality  in  the  interactional  arena  of
outspokenness (Kádár 2013). 
2. Previous research on (im)politeness and (im)morality
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Since Eelen’s (2001) seminal study, research into (im)politeness has strived to bring
together different accounts on politeness – such culture-insider v. culture-outsider and
more general theoretical accounts – with various degrees of success (see, for example,
Watts 2003; Mills 2003; Linguistic Politeness Research Group ed. 2011). Indeed, the
role of metapragmatics to help to disentangle this distinction and provide the analyst
with a potentially robust epistemological account of (im)politeness has been voiced
by  Culpeper  (2011)  and,  more  recently,  by  Kádár  and  Haugh  (2013)  and  Haugh
(2013),  the  latter  with  particular  regard  to  the  relationship  between  morality  and
(im)politeness, albeit without foregrounding the role played by metapragmatics in this
interrelationship, something that we aim to do here.7
Our paper brings together a first  and second order analysis by drawing on
theoretical  conceptualisations  of  ritual,  (im)politeness  and  (im)morality  (see  also
Kádár  and  Haugh  2013)  and  participants’  metacommunicative  orientations  to
(im)politeness and (im)morality. This is because the participants’ behaviour and, in
particular that of the main protagonists – the intervener and the alleged wrongdoer –
constitute metapragmatic verbal behaviour8 as evidenced by the action of intervening
itself and the way in which it is articulated.
Our examination of the relationship between (im)politeness and (im)morality
seeks  to  contribute  to  previous  research  in  this  area.  Recent  studies  by  Arundale
(2013) and Haugh (2013) have  drawn attention  to  the  importance of  morality  for
research on (im)politeness. Although from slightly different theoretical perspectives,
the  authors  maintain  that  morality  has  been  overlooked  despite  the  fact  that
(im)politeness is, after all, a matter of evaluation (Eelen 2001) and, evaluations of
(im)politeness often revolve around issues of morality.  Haugh (2013) has recently
argued that an evaluation of (im)politeness should be seen not only as situated within
social  practices,  but  also  “as  a  form of  social  practice  in  and  of  itself”  (p.  54).
Morality  (and  immorality)  emerges  through  the  participants’ social  practice-based
expectations as to how interactions should unfold, and it  influences the evaluative
practice without the participants necessarily noticing it. Put simply, an improper flow
of events may emerge as “immoral” from a participant’s point of view, without the
participant  necessarily  defining  the  event  as  such.  We  agree  with  Haugh that
evaluations of (im)politeness come into existence through such situated expectations;
however, we contend that morality, in the interactional environment we examine here,
intersects  with  (im)politeness  also in  a  different  respect.9 That  is,  morality  as  we
examine it  appears on the level  of metapragmatics:  this  is  because  evaluations  of
(im)politeness  often  involve  a  folk-theoretical/philosophical  understanding  of
morality  that  is,  in  such evaluations  morality  itself  is  visibly  voiced.  Such moral
evaluations are recurrent and so they constitute a practice in the conversation analytic
sense. Our data show that outspokenness is triggered by what the intervener –and
possibly other bystanders, too – see as the impermissible violation of the victim’s
rights,  and  thus  what  is  considered  to  be  tolerable  in  interpersonal  relationships
according  to  a  given  culture’s  or  group’s  moral  norms.  In  sum,  then,  we  aim to
contribute  to  on-going research by emphasising  the  importance of  studying moral
principles as they are understood in a lay/philosophical-second order sense, within the
evaluative action.
In order to illustrate the type of (im)moral perceptions/evaluations examined
in this paper, let us consider  an interaction from our database:
(1)
Dog left inside a hot car
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A dog is left is in the back seat of car on a very hot day and barks loudly as people
pass by. It is illegal to leave a pet in a car in New Jersey.
1.Female: It’s just so hot in there. […] But, the police are coming right now. 
2. Dog owner: You called the cops? How is any of that your concern? 
3. Female: The dog is in there panting and could die. That’s our concern. 
Not you.
Our examples demonstrate that the intervener rests her or his case on moral principles
that are so basic they can be invoked without having to consider the broader context
i.e. the intervener, a bystander who becomes an interactional side-participant, albeit
unratified by the wrongdoer,10 is interfering in someone else’s intimate relationship
(e.g.  the  relationship  of  “ownership”  in  the  case  of  example  1).  The  bystander
intervention makes manifest the intervener’s reflexive evaluation –and possibly that
of other bystanders, too – of what is going on in someone else’s private realm. Such
metapragmatic  assessment  is  primordially  moral  in  that  it  brings  to  the  fore  the
inadmissibility  of the observed behaviour in as much as it  violates basic personal
rights  (Jarvis  Thomson  1990).11The  notion  of  “basic  personal  rights”  in  our
interpretation covers a cluster of moral perception centered on the beliefs that human
beings (and other livings creatures such as the dog in example 1) are entitled to not to
be abused. 
The intervener – as presumably many of the other bystanders who decide not
to intervene (Kent 2011) – tends to see the alleged violation as part of the public’s
business despite the fact that the behaviour that is being contested may well form part
of private life. In example (1), a clear metacomment that evidences this fact is the
utterance “That’s our [i.e. the company of the intervener (with whom she has probably
been muttering about the wrongdoer’s behaviour),  and, by extension,  the public’s]
concern.” (line 3).12 The wrongdoer’s action coupled with the victim’s reaction (or
lack of) seem to the intervener as encroaching on the “normative condition of what is
permitted to be done to persons, what persons are permitted to do, [and] what sorts of
justifications are required for preventing them from doing what they want” (Nagel
1995: 85). In other words, the wrongdoer’s behaviour violates “the kind of place that
should be occupied by individuals in a moral system – how their lives, actions, and
interests should be recognized by the system of justification and authorization that
constitutes a morality” (Nagel 1995: 85). 
It then follows, that morality – as we approach it in this paper at least, as a
folk-theoretical and philosophical rather than a practice-based interactional notion – is
not always contingent on social practice. It is for this very reason that morality takes
precedence  over  other  considerations  such  as  (im)politeness  or  relatedness,  as
metacommunicatively voiced by the interveners in our examples. In this sense, the
ritual of outspokenness provides us with a prime interactional environment in which
to  examine  the  interrelationship  between  (im)politeness,  (im)morality  and
metapragmatics as foregrounded by the participants themselves. With this in mind,
our study brings metapragmatics into the fold and addresses a current concern about
the future development of (im)politeness research.
When examining the wrongdoer’s behaviour (see Section 3), metalexical elements
such as “You’re being  rude” are often absent.13 Instead, the wrongdoer refers to the
impolite/inappropriate nature of bystander intervention through metacommunicative
comments related to non-debatable “personal rights” (e.g. “this is my girlfriend” – see
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example 2). The intervener, on the other hand, makes metacommunicative appeals to
morality (e.g. “[i]t’s completely inappropriate,” see example 3)14 (see also Section 5).
Our  examples  feature  cases  where  the  intervener  legitimises  her  or  his
intervention by invoking the morality that ought to exist in displays of intimacy in the
public  domain  as  observed  in  the  way  in  which  the  intervention  is  formulated.
Specifically,  the  intervener  mobilises  appeals  to  moral  principles  by  directly
addressing the wrongdoer and the victim while attempting to recruit other bystanders
(see Section 1). As argued elsewhere (Kádár 2013), in this scene it is possible for
bystanders to get involved and support the wrongdoer rather than the intervener. In
these cases an alternative morality principle is interactionally observed, namely one
that is aligned with that of the wrongdoer rather than with the victim. Although this is
possible  given that personal rights,  at  least  in the US, are not self-evident  (Jarvis
Thomson  1990;  Nagel  1995)  in  that  they  are  often  subjected  to  challenges  and
(meta)debated – the examples examined in this paper do not contain any instances of
this. 
In our data the alleged abuser reacts by invoking politeness (and impoliteness)
grounds as he or she appeals to infringements of what Brown and Levinson (1987)
would  define  as  “negative  face,”  i.e.  reference  to  the  abuser’s  right  to  be  left
undisturbed in her or his private space.15 Theoretically speaking, the moral grounds
invoked by the intervener ought to be more prevalent than grounds of politeness as
evidenced by the fact that she or he intervened despite the difficulty that entering into
others’  personal  spaces  implies  (see,  for  example,  Kent  2011).  The  seeming
immorality of the abuser’s action is rooted in the fact that the wrongdoer is intimately
related to the victim so the abuser acts contrary to normative behavioural expectations
in public (also in the sense that one is expected to be non-conflictive in such settings).
Put differently, in the public domain the morality principle is mobilised to do what
one should not possibly do otherwise (e.g. instructing an unknown dog owner about
the norms of pet keeping, as in example 1). This is congruent with the ritual nature of
bystander intervention: as ritual anthropologists and psychologists argue that in ritual
actions the individual often challenges conventional behavioural constraints. 
As  Koster  (2003:  219)  notes,  ritual  produces  “a  temporary  destruction  of
awareness of the wider meaningful relations of one’s individuality and the reduction
of self to the immediate physical experience of the here and now.” Relatedly, Kádár
and de La Cruz (in press) note that the ritual of outspokenness (re)enacts normative
moral  expectations,  and so it  reinforces  the behavioural  norms “moral  order” that
ought to underlie human relations (Whutnow 1989). Therefore, in this ritual action the
intervener voices what he or she understands as the public concern. Our examples
show that the moral order should be observed in public even when the relationship
between the wrongdoer and the victim is an intimate one. In these scenes, therefore,
outspokenness is usually interpreted (at least, by the intervener) as a justified form of
intervention (Drummond 1989) – which is immoral on the surface due to its violative
nature but open to be reinterpreted as moral.
3. Data
The interactions we examine come from Primetime: What Would You Do? (henceforth
WWYD),16 a  United  States  television  programme dedicated  to  featuring  cases  of
outspokenness within bystander intervention (see Kádár and de La Cruz in press for
more information on the programme).17 WWYD is a docu-drama or a fly on the wall
documentary made with the help of secret cameras (see,  for example, Livingstone
1999).
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WWYD,  hosted  by  the  reporter  John  Quiñones,  premiered  on  ABC’s
television channel in the US in 2008. The theme behind the show is that actors act out
scenes  in  which  some type  of  conflict  or  illegal  activity  occurs;  there  are  hidden
cameras that record the event, and the focus is on whether bystanders intervene as
side-participants or not. Bystanders are unaware that they are being observed. This is
important  when  considering  that  not  performing  rituals  of  outspokenness  often
occasions shame (Darley and Latané 1968) and anticipation of an audience triggered
by “double articulation”,  that is,  the awareness that  someone’s behaviour is  being
broadcast  on  the  television  (see,  for  example,  Livingstone  2007)  –  does  not
necessarily  influence  the  behaviour  of  the  bystanders.18 The  programme  features
follow up interviews where Quiñones queries those who intervened and those who do
not. This, in turn, offers the analyst a window into the (non)interveners’ reflections on
their own behaviours. 
In  this  paper  we  analyse  four  interactions  from  a  database  of  117  video
recordings of 2-3 minutes in length. This database of 117 recording features cases of
an intervener interfering in someone else’s intimate relationship and thus infringing
on their private space (Brown and Levinson 1987) as conventionally understood in
US  public  settings  (see,  for  example,  Nelson  2002).  The  particular  examples
examined have been selected due to the clarity of metapragmatic voicing (i.e.  the
metapragmatic  articulation  of  moral  principles)  that  can  be  observed  in  the
interactions. Importantly, these examples offer us a window into the intersection of
(im)politeness and (im)morality via the participants’ metacommunicative privileging
of  one  over  the  other.  As  such,  metacommunicative  voicing  is  the  interactional
mechanism that  enables  us  to  shed light  on  the  dynamics  of  social  versus  moral
oughts within intervention.
The analysis we present is discourse analytic in the broad sense. It draws on
notions from the field of (im)politeness research including Goffmanian concepts such
as  “(dis)alignment,”  “footing”  and  “face”  and,  integrates  conceptualisations  of
bystander  intervention  and  morality  from  social  psychology  and  philosophy
respectively.
4. Analysis
Example  (2),  below,  illustrates  the  tension  between moral  and social  oughts.  The
intervener privileges the former while the abuser brings to the fore what he considers
to be the prevalence of the latter. 
(2)
Abusive boyfriend 
A couple is arguing in the park. Bystanders overhear the argument but seem 
conflicted over intervention. An elderly female bystander decides to intervene.
1.Boyfriend: Stop crying. Shut up! 
2. Elderly female: Hey buddy! Cool it!
3. Boyfriend: Ma’am, can you just let us do our own thing? It’s my 
girlfriend. Can you just leave us alone?
4. Elderly female: No. That’s not how you treat someone. How about I 
call the cops?
Here the intervener, an elderly woman, draws the attention of the wrongdoer with
“Hey  buddy!  Cool  it!”  The  inclusion  of  “buddy”  with  an  accentuated  and  ironic
prosody is clearly conflictive in that it conveys the opposite of its literal meaning: the
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person addressed is not a friend of the intervener.  Whilst “buddy” is not necessarily
used to belittle, it is pragmatically appropriate to signal disagreement or opposition,
and this meaning is even stronger in this interaction  due to the emotive context and
also to the age gap between the wrongdoer and the intervening person. Thus,  the
presence of “buddy” indicates a lack of alignment with the activity of the wrongdoer
and  paves  the  way  for  the  alternative  behaviour  suggested  by  the  intervener.
Importantly, the alleged wrongdoer challenges the intervention by appealing to rights
to privacy. He does this by adopting a routine footing (Zimmerman 1998) typically
used when addressing elderly  strangers  in  the  U.S.  (i.e.  Ma’am).  In  so doing,  he
signals the respect and/or distance (Marquez Reiter and Placencia 2004) that ought to
exist  between complete  strangers  followed by a  conventionally indirect  request  in
which  he  constructs  the  intervener  as  an  outsider.  The  wrongdoer  does  this  by
addressing the intervener as an interferer in as much as he treats her as an unratified
participant in the argument. This is illustrated by the possessive second person plural
(i.e.  “our”),  which  emphasises  the  illegitimacy  of  the  intervener’s  action.  Further
support for his appeal to privacy is offered by his subsequent justification (“It’s my
girlfriend”) followed by an appeal to the intervener to stop interfering the in-group
conversation. The intervener, however, rejects being constructed as an interferer by
invoking morality grounds and threatening to call the relevant authority unless the
wrongdoer  stops.  Specifically,  the  intervener  brings  to  the  fore  the  morality  that
should permeate human relationships – the notion of the proper treatment of others,
which has been a key communal concept in philosophy and religion since antiquity
(Graham and Haidt 2010). In so doing, the intervener makes evident a case where
morality principles take precedence over politeness ones, if we accept that respecting
others’ personal spaces is polite.
Example  (3),  below,  represents  another  case  of  a  bystander  intervening  in
someone  else’s  personal  relationship.  In  this  example,  the  intervener  directly
addresses  both  the  abuser  and  then  the  victim  as  a  result  of  the  abuser’s  initial
dismissal of the bystander’s intervention.
(3)
Abusive boyfriend 
A couple is arguing in the park. Bystanders overhear the argument but seem 
conflicted over intervention. A young female., who is with a couple of friends, decides 
to intervene.
1. Boyfriend: Natalie sit down and listen to me. [pushes Natalie]
         2. Young female: I could see you from up there. You do not push a woman out in 
public. That is complete bullshit.
3. Young female: [turning to Natalie] Seriously, do you need a ride home? 
4. Boyfriend: Natalie, sit down. This is my girlfriend. 
5. Young female: Wait. Who are you talking to? She is not a dog. You are just a 
little punk-ass kid and getting on my last nerve. 
Unlike (2), in this example, the intervener turns to the victim to offer her a lift home.
This alignment attempt seems to boost the disalignment from the wrongdoer – which
takes place in the form of the negatively-loaded taboo items “bullshit” (to refer to the
situation)  and  “little  punk-ass  kid”  (a  person  reference  term)  to  characterise  the
abuser.  As  discussed  elsewhere  (Kádár  and  de  La  Cruz,  in  press),  this  example
demonstrates  how  alignment  situated  in  intervention  has  a  clear  disaligning
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metamessage (Jaworski 1993). In this case, the intervener seems to justify her action
by  invoking  normative  behavioural  expectations  in  public  spaces  rather  than
articulating the weightiness of the morality principle over the politeness one.
Yet, whilst the claim that “You do not push a woman out in public” not only
indexes the wrongdoer’s infringement of the intervener’s right not to be exposed to
such a disturbing scene in public,19 more importantly, it is a moral appeal. That is,
“being gentle with women” is a chivalrous Judeo-Christian moral heritage, which is
deeply rooted in Western societies (often despite many of these societies  defining
themselves as secular), and which has been integrated into (and reinterpreted within)
the modern moral concept of gender equality (Visher 1983). Moreover, there might be
an additional moral element in this utterance to justify the intervention – if boyfriend
can treat her so badly in public, there is a suspicion that he treats her even worse in
private.
Example  4,  below,  illustrates  yet  another  instance  of  immorality  versus
politeness in action.
 (3)
Lesbian parents verbally abused
Lesbian couple eating breakfast with their two kids at a restaurant in Texas. 
The server berates and humiliates the lesbian couple. Several customers 
overhear the server. 
1. Server: You’re gay and you have kids? It’s bad enough that you are 
lesbians but that they don’t have a father. …… I think that is kind of 
bad. You don’t feel uncomfortable – people watching you? Isn’t it bad 
for the kids? I think it’s terrible!
2. [Lesbian couple does not answer and looks very embarrassed.]
3. Young male: Sorry, but you are just being rude. It’s completely 
inappropriate when someone comes into a restaurant to have a 
breakfast with their family that you question their life choices.
4. Server: I just think I am entitled to my own opinion. 
5. Young male: You are entitled to your opinion but this is not the place to
voice your opinion.
6. Server: Is it just me that’s upset? [looks to different directions in the 
restaurant]
In (4), a waitress steps out of her institutional role. She adopts a non-instrumental
footing (Goffman 1979) and verbally attacks some customers (i.e. a lesbian couple
with children). While the victims react by remaining silent, thus apparently dismissing
the waitress’s action, a bystander (i.e. another customer) intervenes. He challenges the
waitress by explicitly accusing her of being impolite.20 He does this by bringing to the
fore the responsibilities that an incumbent of the waiter/ess category should abide by
(cf.  Pomerantz  and  Mandelbaum  2005)  in  the  workplace,  by  indirectly  drawing
attention  to  the  server’s  role  (“when  someone  comes  into  a  restaurant  to  have  a
breakfast”).  The  waitress  reacts  by  making a  (counter-)  appeal  to  the  bystanders’
morality to validate her action and repair damage to face. In return, the intervener
responds by foregrounding the normative behaviour that she is expected to observe in
a public space, perhaps particularly as an incumbent of the service provider category.
This  example  shows  the  general  perceived  moral  importance  of  fulfilling  the
responsibilities associated with given institutional roles in their respective institutional
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settings and the extent to which any violations of the normative behaviour regarding
role  responsibilities,  particularly  when these  are  seen  to  infringe  on  the  rights  of
others (i.e. customers), are deemed impugnable.21
Our final example, (5) below, shows the intervener’s appeal to morality based on the
non-self-evidence of personal rights (Jarvis Thomson 1990; Nagel 1995, see Section
1)  rather  than  on  the  tension  that  in  the  previous  examples  was  shown between
(im)politeness and (im)morality.
(5)
Gay athlete comes out to his friends 
A group of male friends are at a busy shopping centre. One of the group has started to
intimate  to  the  others  that  he  is  gay.  His  friends  start  to  tease  him  and  utter
homophobic slurs. A female overhears the teasing and steps in immediately and says
the friends should not tease the gay person and they should not be so hard on him.
Line 1 below takes place after the “friends” of the gay athlete have already started to
comprehend the situation, and the athlete makes the actual coming out. 
1. Gay person: I have something to tell you guys.
2. Friend: Stop playing bro! You are gay? G-A-Y? [starts laughing and
backs away from gay athlete]
3. Gay person: Yes. 
4. Friend: You really don’t like females? You don’t like girls? You know
what we call males that like men? 
5. Young female: Ya’ll wrong. I heard the conversation. Ya’ll ain’t right.
That’s your friend? 
6. Friend: That was my friend. 
7. Young female: What do you mean was? That shouldn’t stop you guys
from being friends. 
[…]
In this example, the young female who intervenes does so by initially appealing to
morality through increased negative assessments (“Ya’ll wrong,” “Ya’ll ain’t right”).
Specifically,  she  defends  the  right  of  the  victim  to  have  his  personal  choices
respected, especially among friends, by questioning the abuser’s behaviour (“That’s
your  friend?”)  and  offering  a  reflective  evaluation  of  the  morality  that  should
permeate  this  form  of  relatedness  (“That  shouldn’t  stop  you  guys  from  being
friends”). In other words, she proffers her understanding of the way in which friends
should behave towards one another (i.e. social oughts). Unlike our previous examples,
(5) illustrates that  in certain situations social  and moral oughts do not  necessarily
clash with each other but are dependent on each other (cf. Haugh 2013). That is, the
young  female  approaches  the  group  of  friends  in  a  friendly  way,  rather  than
intervening aggressively,  but  still  manages  to  reinstate  what  the public  regards  as
morally right. As Kádár and De La Cruz (forthcoming) argue, such a joint operation
of politeness and morality is largely subject to contextual factors, such as the ongoing
power dynamics, the age and gender of the intervener, and so on.
5. Discussion
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The data studied indicates that a juxtaposition can take place between politeness  - in
our case, the right of in-group interactants to be undisturbed – and morality when an
act  of  injustice  triggers  intervention  and,  that  in  other  situations  such as  the  one
depicted in example (5) (im)politeness and (im)morality interact with each other in
mutually  beneficial  ways.  The  conventional  norm  of  avoiding  conflict  and  not
entering into others’ private spaces is overwritten by the moral need for intervention.
Bystander  intervention  is  expected  by  other  bystanders,  and  as  such  it  is  a
performance that fulfils moral needs (see Section 1).
It is interesting to observe the metapragmatics of bystander intervention from
both the intervener’s and the wrongdoer’s perspectives. In the intervener’s case, not
surprisingly,  moral  issues  are  at  the  centre  of  the  metacommunicative  articulation
observed. Utterances such as “That’s not how your treat someone” (example 2) and
“Who are you talking to? She is not a dog!” (example 3) represent appeals to expected
moral behaviour in that such behaviour contravenes personal rights – and the moral
principles  that  these  rights  entail.  These  appeals  are  metacommunicative.  They
describe the moral norms behind the intervener’s action, rather than making use of an
explicit moral lexicon (“immoral,” “evil,” etc.).
The situation seems to be different in the case of the wrongdoer who usually
makes an appeal to the impolite nature of the intervention via metacommunicative
references to her or his rights (e.g. “Ma’am, can you just let us do our own thing? It’s
my girlfriend.  Can you just  leave  us  alone?”  in  example  2).  This  is  self-evident,
considering that bystander intervention takes place in a scene of aggression, and the
aggressor (the wrongdoer) cannot really make direct appeals to broader normative
behaviour, but rather he or she has to refer to personal rights which presuppose that
the act of bystander intervention contravene/are at odds with these broader norms.
It  is  important again to emphasise that we do not  intend to claim that the
metacommunicative comments from the intervener and wrongdoer always follow an
immorality  versus  impoliteness  schema.  Here  we  should  refer  to  the  fact  that
bystander intervention is a ritual, and as such it is a performance. Exactly because of
this,  the  raison d’être of  its  operation  is  that  the intervener  – and potentially  the
wrongdoer – attempts to align with other bystanders. That is, if the wrongdoer takes
up a counter-offensive position, she or he may refer to moral norms as a counter-
appeal; we could observe this in example 4, in which the wrongdoer makes such an
appeal to her moral “obligation” to denounce the lesbian couple (“Is it just me that’s
upset?”). We should note, however, that in our dataset of 117 video recordings there
are only 5 of such cases which illustrate that the debate between the intervener and the
wrongdoer revolve around moral obligations and conventional rights.
The metacommunicative analysis of such clashes and symbiotic dependence
(i.e. example 4) is not only useful because it shows the importance of morality, but
also because it  reveals  a potential  characteristic  of (im)politeness,  which is  rarely
discussed in the field, namely that appeals to appropriate behaviour and references to
the  other’s  impoliteness  can  actually  become  discursive  resources  utilised  by
wrongdoers to legitimise their actions and challenge those of others.
The  following  figure  illustrates  the  operation  of  metacommunicative
juxtapositions in scenes of interruption.
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morality appeal         politeness appeal
Intervener
politeness appeal       morality appeal
Bystanders
Wrongdoer 
(&Victim)
Figure 1: The Metacommunicative Operationalisation of (Im)Morality and (Im)Politeness
The  circle  around  the  wrongdoer  and  the  victim represents  the  intimacy  of  their
relationship, which is threatened by the act of bystander intervention; the victim is
denoted in brackets, since she or he tends to be a passive participant of the event.22The
arrows represent the appeals made by the intervener and the wrongdoer; the arrow of
the wrongdoer’s morality appeal and the intervener’s politeness is dashed, in order to
denote that 1) these types of conversational patterns are less typical, and 2) that they
can jointly operate with the default appeal and counter-appeal of the intervener and
the wrongdoer. The dotted line above bystanders indicates that bystanders can take
sides and join the flow of events as supporters (see Kádár and De La Cruz in press),
and that the ritual of outspokenness, and the wrongdoer’s counter-action, represent a
struggle to align with bystanders.
6. Conclusion
In  the  present  paper  we have  inquired  into  a  neglected  aspect  of  the  relationship
between (im)politeness and (im)morality, by looking into participants’ understandings
and  perceptions  of  moral  and/or  polite  values  as  evidenced  by  their
metacommunicative voicing. We have argued that morality is not always contingent
on social practice as a phenomenon “unseen” for the participants and not necessarily a
social practice in and of itself – but rather a phenomenon that people perceive and
define. This is because first order interactant perceptions of morality include personal
rights  (see the discussion in  Section 1 on Nagel 1995, Jarvis Thomson 1990, and
Bicchieri  2006),  and  second  order  folk-theoretical/philosophical  meta-accounts  of
morality include definitions of these rights. By examining this topic, we have relied
on  conceptualisations  drawn  from  social  psychology  and  philosophy,  and  we
integrated these conceptualisations into politeness research.  By doing so,  we have
continued the work of scholars such as Holtgraves (2005) and Spencer-Oatey (2007)
who laid down the foundations of social psychological inquiries into (im)politeness
phenomena; considering that this article is written for the anniversary issue of the
Journal of Politeness Research, we feel that it is important for us to draw attention to
the importance of investing energy into this research area. 
Due to its limited scope, this study has only made some initial inquiry into the
intersection of (im)morality and (im)politeness. The phenomenon of morality needs to
be further studied both within and outside of the bystander intervention arena. For
example,  a  key  phenomenon  to  address  is  the  cross-cultural  aspect  of  moral
judgements.  As  the  preliminary  results  of  an  on-going  research  (see  Kádár
forthcoming) seem to indicate, there are noteworthy cross-cultural differences in the
ways in which the act of help is  moralised across cultures;  also there are cultural
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differences  between  the  normative  cultural  perceptions  of  the  appropriateness  of
certain types of bystander intervention. It would also be useful for future studies to
explore the extent to which metacommunication is operationalised differently across
cultures,  based on different understandings of personal rights  and what is  deemed
socially acceptable behaviour. For example, personal rights are not self evident in the
normative  US  cultural  context  but,  as  Ting-Toomey’s  (2012:  112–116)  study
convincingly  pointed out,  this  situation  might  be different  in  other  cultures.  Such
differences  are  likely  to  manifest  themselves  in  differences  between  the  ways  in
which metacommunication is operationalised when it comes to violations of rights.
Finally,  by  examining  an  array  of  interactional  contexts,  including  everyday,
institutional  and  ritual  interaction  across  cultures,  we  could  further  unravel  the
demonstrated  intersectionality  between  (im)politeness,  (im)morality  and
metapragmatics  with  a  view  to  strengthening  the  methodological  apparatus  with
which we work.
Notes
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1. We would like to express our gratitude to Francesca Bargiela-Chiappini for her insightful comments on an
earlier draft of this paper. We are also indebted to Liz Marsden for checking the style of this work. Our thank
you goes to Karen Grainger and Isabelle van der Bom. Last but not least, we are thankful to the anonymous 
Referees for their feedback on the manuscript of this paper. Needless to say that all the remaining errors 
belong to us.
2. It is important to draw a distinction between the participants’ first order perceptions and second order 
understandings of an interactional phenomenon. When it comes to the metapragmatics of morality and moral
judgments (Section 1), an act is perceived as (im)moral when metacomments on it reflect the participants’ 
folk-theoretical/philosophical understandings of it (see  Kádár and Haugh 2013).
3. It is pertinent to note that forms of endorsement span hardly noticeable non-verbal signs, through to 
cheering and verbal attacks on the wrongdoer (see Kádár and De La Cruz, in press). 
4. And possibly in private, too. This, however, is not demonstrable on the basis of our data.
5. For example, when a member of the public is engrossed in reading on a park bench and a couple sits on 
the bench and starts arguing thus disturbing the reader’s personal space, resulting in her or him butting in.
6. We use “principle” in the non-Leechian (1983) sense. By principle we refer here to a mental and 
emotional motivation that is primordial and offers both the wrongdoer and the intervener a starting point to 
argue in favour or against each other’s behaviour. 
7. See also Pizziconi’s (2012) yet unpublished inquiry into the metapragmatics of morality in Japanese.
8. Non-verbal metacommunicative behaviour is also observable in interactional gaps, silences and other 
forms of dispreferred responses through which participants project their disalignment with respect to a prior 
action. They thus indicate their interpretation of their interlocutor’s agenda and their (own) positioning. Non-
verbal communicative behaviour may also entail a physical response without any verbal articulation (e.g.   an
intervener removing a victim from a scene of injustice without any verbal voicing Kádár and De La Cruz, in 
press).
9. Note that this argument is explored in detail using Chinese and Japanese data in the forthcoming 
monograph of Haugh and Kádár (2015).
10. In a sense, it would be possible to argue that the dog owner ratifies the intervener’s participation by 
engaging in a conversation with her. However, the comment “[h]ow is any of that your concern?” indicates 
that the owner’s view is that the intervener is acting beyond her status as a passive bystander, i.e. her status is
unratified from the wrongdoer’s point of view.
11. It is important to emphasise that our notion of morality is not contradictory with how Haugh approaches 
this concept (2013). As Kádár and De La Cruz (in press) argue, actions that are regarded as immoral can also 
upset interactional expectations, i.e. there is an important interface between interactional and folk-
theoretical/philosophical definitions of morality.
12. Note that “Not you” in this line can be interpreted two ways: as a put-down (you horrible person, you, 
unlike the dog, are not worth being concerned about), and also as a reassurance about the absence of hostile 
interpersonal intentions (the intention in calling the police is not to get you into trouble but to save the dog). 
The prosody of the utterance seems to indicate to us that the case is the former. 
13. This is, however, not a “rule.” Note that in our data metalexemes seem to gain more importance in the 
intervener’s rather than in the wrongdoer’s metapragmatic behaviour – for example, when the intervener 
combines metacommunicative appeals to morality with claims that the wrongdoer’s behaviour is also 
socially inappropriate; in such cases, metalexical elements such as “You’re being rude” are relatively 
common (see e.g. extract 3). This difference between the metapragmatic behaviours of the wrongdoer and 
the intervener presumably comes from their different roles (see more in Section 5).
14. In our data we also observed a few metacommunicative appeals that were metalexical by nature, 
although such examples were rare. More specifically, Kádár and De La Cruz (in press) discuss cases when 
interveners use citations of religious origin, such as “Don’t judge!” (after the intervener explicitly advises the
wrongdoer to read the Bible). Whilst such citations are not metalexemes in a strict sense, they are on the 
border between metalexicon and metacommunication due to their formulaic nature. 
15. We use the Brown and Levinsonian term here as a default one, simply because in our American English 
data this notion seems applicable. However, it is important to emphasise that the ritual of outspokenness 
exists in cultures, such as Chinese and Japanese, in which the validity of the Brown and Levinsonian 
framework has received severe criticism (see, for example, Ide (1989); Kádár (forthcoming) on 
outspokenness in Sino-Japanese data.)
16. See: <http://abc.go.com/shows/what-would-you-do>
17. It is pertinent to note that WWYD is not the first of such shows – in a sense it can be regarded as an 
“inheritor” of the British series Candid Camera and its later versions in different countries. However, a 
unique feature of WWYD, as far as we are aware, is that it focuses on social problems and abuse in 
particular.
18. It is worth adding, however, that as these events occur in a public space bystanders are potentially 
observable by other bystanders, and that once they intervene they may well become the focus of these 
bystanders’ attention – and so there is a sense of being (potentially) observed in such interactions, but this is 
presumably different from the sense of being under surveillance all the time, as in the case of double-
articulated TV shows. Although the study of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible that the
prospect of being observed by other bystanders is, for some people, a deterrent to intervening when 
otherwise they would have done so. 
19. It is pertinent to note that while it is equally intolerable to push a woman in private, in our data we often 
encounter appeals to the public nature of an abuse, as in the case of example (3). This is because, as we 
argued earlier, engaging in an illegal-disturbing action in public is, in a sense, an intrusion into the private 
spaces of the bystanders who are forced to watch the scene. 
20. Here we follow Culpeper’s (2011) suggestion to categorise metalexemes such as “rude” under the 
technical notion of impoliteness. 
21. Note that the importance of institutional role in this case reflects only our reading of the interaction. Yet,
there are certain evidences within the interaction that point to the fact that from the intervening person’s 
perspective the server’s institutional role is important: he uses both the verb “comes into” (as opposed to ‘is’)
and the indefinite article before ‘breakfast’ as indexing the position of the server (the latter because only 
service providers deal with countable breakfasts – ordinary people just have non-count breakfast). 
22. As Kádár and De La Cruz (in press) note, the passivity of the victim is a key factor for intervention to
operate.
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